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COLIN MCGINN. "EVOLUTION. ANIMALS. AND THE 
BASIS OF MORALITY". INQUIRY 22 (1979). PP. 
81-99. 
Colin McGinn aruges that "[wlhat makes
 
morality possible--namely, the cognitive
 
character of moral reasons--involves no
 
restriction of its scope, either to the
 
family or to the group or to the species."
 
(p. 98) He begins by exposing an ubiquitous 
misunderstanding of evolutionary theory; 
he argues that genes, rather than groups, 
are the units of natural selection. McGinn 
then poses the following question: If the 
mainspring of morality is sentiment that 
develops in accordance with the principles 
of natural selection, how can the upsurge 
and continuance of altruism that is inde­
pendent of kin relations be explained? He 
argues that such altruism, and hence 
"genuine morality", can only be explained 
by rejecting the view that morality is 
founded on sentiment in favor of the view 
that morality is founded of' reason. Altru­
ism that is independent of ~:in relations 
persists because it is part and parcel of 
rationality, and rationality is to the 
advantage of an organism's genes. In 
NcGinn's words, "[m]orality, which jibs 
at the ruthless ways of natural selection, 
is the price the genes pay for intelligent 
survival machines." (p. 93) This implies 
that there cannot be creatures who are both 
rational and amoral. The fiial step in 
McGinn's argument is that si.ce morality 
is founded on reason, and since reason 
requires the ~ecognition of the reality 
of other beings and their interests, 
"morality recommends the extension of 
human concern beyond the bounds of our 
own species." (p. 98) 
One could respond to this argument in 
a number of ways. One could quarrel with 
HcGinn's distinction between sentiment 
and reason, or his distinction between cog­
nitivism and non-cognitivism, or deny that 
reason requires as much as McGinn believes. 
I will sketch two different lines of 
attack that one might explore. 
i~hen t1cGinn argueS that "cognitivism" 
is the only explanation of the upsurge and 
continuance of altruism that is independent 
of kin relations, he assumes that such 
altruism is not in the interests of the 
altruist's genes. Yet recent work by 
Robert Trivers and John Maynard Smith has 
~een directed towards showing that some kin­
~ndependent altruism is in the interests of 
the altruist's genes. (See, for example, 
the article by Smith in the September, 1978 
issue of Scientific American.) If Smith 
and.Trivers are r~ght, morality may be ex­
pla~nable by sent~ment developed in accor­
dance with natural selection after all. . 
Alternatively, one could argue that ~orality
is not directly linked to biology. One of 
the central differences between humans and 
most other animals is the relative openness 
of our programs. It is this relative open­
ness that permits the development of social 
practices that are not directly genetically 
determined. Morality, to put the point 
crudely, might well be a matter of "con­
venti(:m". rather than a matter of biology. 
If th~s ~s so, then there will be no 
explanation of morality forthcoming in the 
terms that McGinn envisions. 
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McGinn's argument is quite ingenious. 
I have btp.n unable to do it justice in 
this shor~ review. It is worthy of care­-
ful attention from all those concerned 
with the foundations of morality or the 
moral status of animals. 
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